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Restricting Adult Access to Material Obscene as to Juveniles 
Within the morass of Supreme Court rulings regarding the relation 
of the first amendment to pornography, 1 the Court's opinion in Gins-
berg v. New York 2 created a paradox unparalleled even by its other 
pornography decisions. In Ginsberg the Court upheld a novel speech 
classification: material obscene as to juveniles but protected as to 
adults. 3 The paradox thus created is that a judicial declaration that a 
thing is "obscene" defoliates that thing's first amendment protection;4 
yet in the absence of that classification - and assuming no other con-
stitutional infirmities - speech is accorded the full battery of first 
amendment privileges. The peculiarity of Ginsberg is that it allows 
speech to be at once immune from restriction as to some (adults) and 
completely prohibitable as to others (juveniles). 
Although the Ginsberg Court acknowledged the state's right to 
deny juvenile access to material5 that could not be denied to adults, it 
did not indicate the extent to which - or even whether - a state's 
right to withhold may infringe upon the adult's right to obtain. The 
statute at issue in Ginsberg proscribed only the sale of specified por-
nography to minors;6 hence, it was a relatively easy case because laws 
1. For the purposes of this Note, nothing hinges on the precise coverage of the term "pornog-
raphy." Webster's Third New International Dictionary will suffice: "l: a description of prosti-
tutes or prostitution 2: a depiction (as in writing or painting) of licentiousness or lewdness: a 
portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement - compare erotica." For that 
matter Justice Stewart's test for material of a saltier character is adequate: "I shall not today 
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within [the descrip-
tion 'hardcore' pornography] .... But I know it when I see it .... " Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 
184, 197 (1964). "Obscenity," on the other hand, is a term of art meaning material that 
"the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find •.. taken as 
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and ... taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted). Obscenity, thus defined, is not 
protected by the first amendment. 
2. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
3. See Part I infra. 
4. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
5. For simplicity, material obscene as to juveniles will also be referred to as "juvenile 
obscenity." 
6. The Court held that the state may "defin[e] obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors." 
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638. Unqualified obscenity retains no access rights; therefore, to define a 
thing as "obscene" as to a specified sub-group is necessarily to grant the state a right to prohibit 
that sub-group's access to the thing. Moreover, the Court states elsewhere: 
[Appellant] insists that the denial to minors under 17 of access to material condemned by 
[the challenged statute], insofar as that material is not obscene for persons 17 years of age or 
older, constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of protected liberty . 
. . . We conclude that we cannot say that the statute invades the area of freedom of 
expression constitutionally secured to minors. 
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636-37 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). 
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that prohibit only the actual sale of juvenile obscenity cause, at worst, 
quite minor inconvenience for adults. 7 However, state laws that also 
forbid juvenile access to the same material starkly illustrate the uncer-
tainty created by the Ginsberg holding. When a state forbids juvenile 
access to the same material, the incidental effects upon adults are 
greater, and the case is not so easy. 
Indeed, faced with basically indistinguishable statutes, 8 federal 
courts of appeals have split. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits, in Upper 
Midwest Booksellers Association v. City of Minneapolis 9 and M.S. News 
Co. v. Casado 10 respectively, upheld state statutes outlawing commer-
cial displays that permitted juvenile access to sexually oriented mate-
rial deemed "harmful to minors."11 More recently, however, the 
Fourth Circuit in American Booksellers Association v. Virginia 12 struck 
down the same sort of statute on two grounds. First, the regulation 
"impose[d] restrictions based on the content of publications" and 
therefore, the court reasoned, violated the familiar axiom that speech 
regulations must be content-neutral.13 But the statute's "most serious 
flaw," according to the court, was its breadth.14 Although acknowl-
edging the state's interest in limiting the availability of sexually related 
material to minors, the court held that any display method fit to the 
task was "unduly burdensome on the first amendment rights of 
7. The statute at issue in Ginsberg provided: 
1. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to exhibit for a monetary consideration to 
a minor or knowingly to sell to a minor an admission ticket or pass or knowingly to admit a 
minor for a monetary consideration to premises whereon there is exhibited, a motion pic-
ture, show or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct 
or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors. 
2. A violation of any provision hereof shall constitute a misdemeanor. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 484-h (McKinney 1967), quoted in Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 645-47 (currently 
codified in N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 235.21 (McKinney 1980)). "Minor" was defined as a person 
under seventeen years of age and the definition of "harmful to minors" tracked the Supreme 
Court's standard for obscenity. See text at note 17 infra. 
8. In fact, the resulting inconvenience for adults is so meager that the Ginsberg Court ignored 
it. Yet despite the fact that the Supreme Court acknowledged none, some first amendment rights 
of adults are implicated by the Ginsberg ruling. Adults, particularly those of pubescent appear· 
ance, may be compelled to furnish identification before purchasing material to which they have 
constitutional rights. Moreover, the preliminary requirement of having to prove one's majority 
might "for a variety of reasons," deter an adult from purchasing the material. Cf. American 
Booksellers Assn. v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691, 696 (4th Cir. 1986), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 
1281 (1987) (No. 86-1034). That these are actual infringements becomes clear when one 
imagines the probable reaction of the Court to a state law that required identification for the 
purchase of, e.g., The Communist Manifesto. 
9. 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985). 
10. 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983). 
11. MS. News, 721 F.2d at 1295-97 (Appendix); Upper Midwest Booksellers, 780 F.2d at 
1406-08 (Appendix). 
12. 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987) (No. 86-1034). 
13. American Booksellers Assn., 802 F.2d at 695. See Part II.B infra for a discussion of 
content-neutrality. 
14. American Booksellers Assn., 802 F.2d at 695. The overbreadth charge is discussed at 
notes 84-90 infra and accompanying text. 
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adults." 15 
This Note considers whether state regulations that restrict juvenile 
access to material that is obscene as to minors unconstitutionally en-
croach upon the first amendment rights of adults. Part I briefly de-
scribes the Court's opinion in Ginsberg. Part II introduces the 
"O'Brien 16 analysis" and discusses the aspects of juvenile access re-
strictions that tend to make O'Brien scrutiny applicable. In this con-
text the frequently relaxed judicial review of governmental restrictions 
on sexually related material will be discussed. Having concluded that 
the O'Brien analysis is applicable to access restrictions, Part III applies 
the test and ultimately concludes that juvenile access restrictions sur-
vive O'Brien scrutiny. 
I. THE BACKDROP: GINSBERG V. NEW YORK 
The Ginsberg opinion itself resolves perhaps the most difficult 
question posed by juvenile access restrictions by sustaining a separate 
standard of obscenity for juveniles. In Ginsberg the Court considered 
the constitutionality of a New York statute that forbade the sale of 
material "harmful to minors." The statutory definition of "harmful to 
minors" modified the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity by 
adapting it to minors: 
"Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or represen-
tation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, 
or sado-masochistic abuse, when it: (i) predominantly appeals to the 
prurient ... interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing 
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is 
suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social 
importance for minors. 17 
Justice Brennan's majority opinion approved the concept of "variable 
obscenity," noting that the statute at issue "simply adjusts the defini-
tion of obscenity 'to social realities by permitting the appeal of this 
type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests ... ' of 
such minors."18 
Although the Court did not constrain legislatures to a particular 
definition of "obscene as to minors," the statute upheld by the Court 
was a reconciliation of the prevailing standard of obscenity with a 
lower standard for minors. 19 A statutory definition of "obscene as to 
15. American Booksellers Assn., 802 F.2d at 696. 
16. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
17. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 484-h (McKinney 1967), quoted in Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 645-47 
(currently codified in N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 235.20 (McKinney 1980)). 
18. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966)). 
19. The Court's test for obscenity when Ginsberg was decided was the one announced in 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). However, that definition has since been replaced by 
the standard established in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Adapting the current ob-
scenity definition to the sensibilities of juveniles suggests that material is obscene as to juveniles 
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juveniles" that simply modifies the current criteria for obscenity by 
attaching the addendum "as to juveniles" is, therefore, constitutional. 
Each of the three statutes that have come before the federal courts 
of appeals basically conforms to this standard; which, because it is 
" 'virtually identical to the Supreme Court's most recent statement of 
the elements of obscenity,' ... gives 'men in acting adequate notice of 
what is prohibited' and does not offend the requirements of due pro-
cess."20 Therefore, arguments of the "slippery slope" genre, at least 
regarding the breadth of the "juvenile obscenity" classification, are not 
germane. If "obscene as to juveniles" improperly sweeps within its 
scope Lady Chatterley's Lover, 21 it does so irrespective of whether the 
bookseller must prevent juvenile access to the book or, as Ginsberg 
allows, only refuse to sell it to juveniles.22 
Ginsberg also establishes that the states have a substantial interest 
in making the designated material unavailable to minors. The state's 
interest in "the well-being of its children" and, in particular, its inter-
est in placing "limitations upon the availability of sexual material to 
minors"23 was a necessary antecedent to the Court's approval of a ju-
venile standard of obscenity in Ginsberg.24 Acknowledging that the 
whenever (a) the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that 
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of minors; (b) the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way with respect to what is suitable for juveniles, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. Cf. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. While it is 
not clear that a more expansive definition of "obscene as to juveniles" would be unconstitutional, 
the analysis of this Note will proceed on the assumption that the access restrictions in question 
define juvenile obscenity within the constitutional demarcation announced in Ginsberg. 
20. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 643 (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 76, 271 
N.Y.S.2d 947, 953, 218 N.E.2d 668, 672, appeal dismissed sub nom. Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 
U.S. 12 (1966), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957)). 
21. See Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 
684 (1959) (reversing the Regents' denial of a license to show the motion picture version of Lady 
Chatterley's Lover). But see Justice Harlan's dissent in Roth, 354 U.S. at 506 ("The fact that the 
people of one State cannot read some of the works of D.H. Lawrence seems to me, if not wise or 
desirable, at least acceptable."). 
22. That is, the routine objection to any definition of obscenity - that it will render Huckle· 
berry Finn naked before the censors - is relevant only to the Ginsberg decision itself, not to cases 
dealing with access restrictions. See generally, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 37-47 (Douglas, J., dis· 
senting) (objecting that the announced obscenity test "would make it possible to ban any paper 
or any journal or magazine in some benighted place," 413 U.S. at 44). If state enforcement 
officers demand blinder racks for Huckleberry Finn, the Constitution will have been violated not 
by the restriction of access to juvenile obscenity, but rather by the misapplication of the juvenile 
obscenity standard itself. But the Ginsberg definition of juvenile obscenity is a settled constitu· 
tional issue. Access restrictions should not reignite definitional objections. 
23. The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional 
power to regulate, and, in our view, ... justif{ies] the limitations in [the juvenile obscenity 
statute] upon the availability of sex material to minors under 17, at least if it was rational for 
the legislature to find that the minors' exposure to such material might be harmful. 
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639. 
24. "We ... cannot say that [the statute], in defining the obscenity of material on the basis of 
its appeal to minors under 17, has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such 
minors from harm." 390 U.S. at 643. 
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sexually explicit material at issue did not qualify as pure obscenity and 
therefore retained constitutional protection as to adults, the Court 
observed: 
That the State has power to [create a distinct standard of obscenity for 
minors] seems clear, for we have recognized that even where there is an 
invasion of protected freedoms "the power of the state to control the 
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults 
"25 
To the extent that the Court permits an "invasion" of freedoms other-
wise guaranteed by the Constitution it abrogates their status as "pro-
tected freedoms."26 The state's interest partially ejects this material 
from the category of first amendment speech. Consequently, as to mi-
nors, juvenile obscenity has the constitutional status that outright ob-
scenity has with regard to the population at large: it is not "speech" of 
the first amendment. Absent the adult world, state prohibitions on 
juvenile access to Ginsberg-type material would be constitutionally 
flawless. 
On the other hand, absent the juvenile population and the attend-
ant state interest in the welfare of its children, juvenile access restric-
tions would unquestionably fall.27 Access restrictions inevitably 
impose inconveniences on adult pornography purchasers. Blinder 
racks, sealed covers, or separate rooms for adults obstruct adult access 
to material that is fully protected as to adults. Thus, Ginsberg creates 
a category of expression that is simultaneously "speech" and "non-
speech." Laws that seek to regulate the nonspeech element - juvenile 
access - inescapably touch the speech element - adult access. 
II. THE O'BRIEN TEST 
A. The Test 
In United States v. O'Brien, 28 the Court announced a test of consti-
tutionality for regulations that affect both speech and nonspeech. 
O'Brien had burned his draft card publicly "so that other people 
would reevaluate their positions with Selective Service, with the armed 
forces, and reevaluate their place[s] in the culture of today, to hope-
fully consider [O'Brien's] position."29 He was immediately arrested 
and ultimately convicted of violating the Universal Military Training 
25. 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)). 
26. "Obscenity" and "free speech" are mutually exclusive categories and the Court held this 
material obscene as to juveniles. See generally Schauer, Speech and "Speech" - Obscenity and 
"Obscenity": An Exercise in tlze Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 
(1979). 
27. The requisite countervailing state interest is not limited to a concern with the well-being 
of its youth. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (city's interest in 
the quality of its neighborhoods justifies a restriction on the exercise of first amendment rights). 
28. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
29. 391 U.S. at 370. 
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and Service Act. 30 
Noting that the violation was not premised on the public or expres-
sive character of the card's destruction, the Court compared the puta-
tive abridgement of free speech to "a motor vehicle law prohibiting the 
destruction of drivers' licenses, or a tax law prohibiting the destruction 
of books and records. "31 Yet, O'Brien's expressive activity did suffer, 
and this is what the Court's test addressed. A governmental regula-
tion of conduct that involves both "speech" and "nonspeech" elements 
will not be invalidated, the Court held, "[1] if it furthers an important 
or substantial governmental interest; [2] if the governmental interest 
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [3] if the inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater 
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."32 Although first 
amendment rights were closely intertwined with the activity regulated, 
the Court concluded that the governmental interest in the regulation 
was limited to "insur[ing] the continuing availability of issued certifi-
cates." Thus, the Court upheld the law under which O'Brien was 
convicted. 
The peculiarly disjointed nature of juvenile obscenity - nonspeech 
as to the direct regulatees, speech as to those incidentally regulated -
seems to track the O'Brien speech/nonspeech paradigm.33 In fact, the 
strict language of O'Brien suggests that the O'Brien analysis controls 
whenever there is a nonspeech object in a governmental regulation af-
fecting speech. However, the Court may have claimed a broader range 
for its test than it would be willing to apply in practice. Determining 
whether access restrictions fit within the more limited range of prac-
tice requires that the unspoken prerequisite to O'Brien analysis be 
exposed. 
B. The Latent Exception to the Applicability of the O'Brien Test 
It is possible to imagine governmental regulations of speech that 
would clear each of the O'Brien hurdles but which would be held un-
constitutional, nonetheless. Professor John Hart Ely suggests that an 
30. Codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(b) (1982) (construed in 391 U.S. at 370). 
31. 391 U.S. at 375. 
32. 391 U.S. at 377. As originally stated, the test also includes the requirement that the 
regulation be "within the constitutional power of the Government." This segment of the test is 
omitted from the text because, as Professor Ely has observed, "[I]t is superfluous in light of the 
most natural reading of what is designated criterion [1]." Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in 
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 
1483-84 n. 10 (1975). 
33. Commentators have generally agreed that the O'Brien approach is not limited to sym-
bolic speech. See, e.g .. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 580-601 (1978); Ely, supra 
note 32; Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 470-
74 (1980); Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo. 
L.J. 727, 742-47 (1980); Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. 
L. REV. 113, 126-27 (1981). 
June 1987] Note - Obscenity Access Restrictions 1687 
anti-handbilling ordinance intended to reduce litter would be such a 
law.34 The governmental interest is substantial, unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression, and arguably promoted by no less restric-
tive alternative. 
In Schneider v. New Jersey (Town of Irvington), 35 however, the 
Court struck down an anti-handbilling ordinance on first amendment 
grounds. Commentators have explained the Schneider case as an ex-
ception to the O'Brien test for speech in "traditional" or "public" 
fora. 36 Public forum speech, unlike the symbolic speech involved in 
draft card burning, is at the core of first amendment freedoms. It has 
been argued, therefore, that an implicit prerequisite to the O'Brien test 
is that the speech incidentally affected be outside this core. 37 Alterna-
tively, it might be argued that even if there is no formal "exception" to 
O'Brien, the Court nonetheless reserves O'Brien analysis for regula-
tions that by their nature warrant lenient scrutiny.38 
There is little doubt of the Supreme Court's view that juvenile ob-
scenity is not at the core of first amendment freedoms nor otherwise 
deserving of special protection, at least since Young v. American Mini 
Theaters. 39 Young c~ncerned the constitutionality of a Detroit zoning 
ordinance which prohibited adult theaters, bookstores, and cabarets 
from locating within certain distances from other regulated businesses 
or residential areas.40 The city justified the ordinance with the argu-
34. Ely, supra note 32, at 1484-90. 
35. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
36. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 32 at 1486-87. Thus, according to Ely, state regulations of 
speech in conventional fora ·will not be subject to O'Brien analysis, even if the restriction of 
expression is incidental. Instead, such regulations will receive a "serious balancing version ofless 
restrictive alternative analysis." Id. at 1488. 
37. See Ely, supra note 32, at 1488-89. The public forum exception itself has never been 
acknowledged by the Court. Instead the Court has reconciled the anti-handbilling ordinance at 
issue in Schneider with O'Brien analysis by claiming that the anti-handbilling ordinance violates 
O'Brien's requir~ment that statutes incidentally restraining speech be the least restrictive alterna-
tive. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-10 (1984). It is 
violated by an anti-handbilling ordinance, according to the Court, because the government could 
simply "eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy" by proscribing littering. 466 
U.S. at 808. 
38. The Court has never failed to uphold a regulation analyzed as an incidental restriction 
under O'Brien. See Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restric-
tions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARYL. REv. 779, 787-88 (1985); see also Arcara v. Cloud 
Books, 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 
(1984); Heffron v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1980); 
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972). 
39. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
40. The ordinance classified a bookstore or theater as an "adult establishment" if it presented 
"material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, decribing, or relat-
ing to 'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas.'" The ordinance defined 
"Specified Sexual Activities" as: 
1. Human Genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal; 
2. Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy; 
3. Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttock or female 
breast. 
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ment that a concentration of adult establishments leads to a general 
deterioration of the neighborhood.41 The Court, speaking through 
Justice Stevens, upheld the ordinance as a "[r]easonable regulation[] 
of the time, place, and manner of protected speech,"42 noting that 
"[t]he mere fact that the commercial exploitation of material protected 
by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other licensing 
requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating these 
ordinances. "43 
The more interesting part of Justice Stevens' opinion is the portion 
joined by only three other justices.44 There, Justice Stevens responded 
to the theaters' challenge under the equal protection clause by point-
ing out that "[t]he question whether speech is, or is not, protected by 
the First Amendment often depends on the content of the speech."45 
As for expression "on the borderline between pornography and artistic 
expression,"46 Stevens asserted that "society's interest in protecting 
this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude 
than the interest in untrammeled political debate."47 Stevens noted 
that the restrictions applied irrespective of "whatever social, political, 
or philosophical message" the designated material conveyed, and con-
cluded from this fact that "the government's paramount obligation of 
neutrality" was fulfilled.48 Because the speech regulated in Young was 
of little value, or in Stevens' colorful phrase, because "few of us would 
And "Specified Anatomical Areas" was defined as: 
1. Less than completely and opaquely covered: (a) human genitals, pubic region, 
{b) buttock, and (c) female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola; and 
2. Human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely and opaquely 
covered. 
Detroit Zoning Ordinance, effective Nov. 2, 1972, quoted in Young, 427 U.S. at 53.54 nn. 4 & 5. 
These definitions of sexual motifs resemble the statutory description of material obscene as to 
juveniles upheld in Ginsberg. Cf note 7 supra. 
41. Young, 427 U.S. at 54-55. 
42. 427 U.S. at 63 n. 18. 
43. 427 U.S. at 62. 
44. Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist joined all of Justice Stevens' 
opinion. Justice Powell joined the holding as to time, place, and manner regulation, but declined 
to join part III of Justice Stevens's opinion, which deals with distinctions among types of pro· 
tected speech. Instead, Justice Powell concurred on the ground that reasonable zoning regula· 
tions should be analyzed under O'Brien, and that under that analysis the Anti-Skid Row 
ordinance was constitutional. 
45. 427 U.S. at 66. Justice Stevens elaborated: 
Thus, the line between permissible advocacy and impermissible incitation to crime or vio· 
lence depends, not merely on the setting in which the speech occurs, but also on exactly 
what the speaker had to say. Similarly, it is the content of the utterance that determines 
whether it is a protected epithet or an unprotected "fighting comment." And in time of war 
"the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops" may 
unquestionably be restrained, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 
although publication of news stories with a different content would be protected. 
427 U.S. at 66 (footnotes omitted). 
46. 427 U.S. at 61. 
47. 427 U.S. at 70. 
48. 427 U.S. at 70. 
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march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right 
to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theater of our 
choice"4 9 - the Detroit ordinance was upheld. 50 
Regardless of whether one agrees that first amendment protection 
ought to diminish as one drifts away from a conceptual "core,"51 the 
Young plurality opinion can at least be taken to confirm that porno-
graphic material is not at that core.52 Consequently, even if the Court 
is discriminating in its application of O'Brien, juvenile access restric-
tions present precisely the type of issue which should receive O'Brien 
scrutiny. The idea that protected speech can be stratified according to 
its value, and that sexual speech occupies a lower stratum, was flatly 
asserted in Young. Moreover, the definition of juvenile obscenity par-
allels that of the "Specified Sexual Activities" in Young.53 It, too, "is 
49. 427 U.S. at 70. 
50. The holding in Young was recently affirmed by a majority of the Court in Renton v. 
Playtime Theaters, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986). For additional examples of lenient first amendment 
review of state regulations of sexually oriented speech, see Arcara v. Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. 
3172 (1986) (first amendment not violated by enforcement against adult bookstore of New York 
statute allowing closure of premises found to be used as place for prostitution and lewdness); 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (distribution of child pornography held not entitled to 
first amendment protection provided the conduct to be prohibited is adequately defined by the 
applicable state law); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (first amendment does not 
prohibit FCC regulation of broadcast dealing with sex and excretion); California v. LaRue, 409 
U.S. 109 (1972) (state regulations prohibiting explicitly sexual live entertainment and films in 
bars and other establishments licensed to dispense alcoholic beverages by the drink sustained 
against first amendment challenge); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (material not 
obscene as to the "average person" may nonetheless be unprotected by the first amendment 
where the material is designed for and distributed primarily to a clearly defined deviant sexual 
group if the theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest of the mem-
bers of that group). 
51. The proposition that first amendment protection for constitutional "speech" can vary 
based on the value of speech is hotly contested within both the Court and the academic commu-
nity. One opponent of speech valuation, Justice Stewart, dissented in Young, insisting that no 
speech may be deemed "less worthy of constitutional protection." Indeed, Stewart asserted, 
"[l]n the absence of a judicial determination of obscenity, it is by no means clear that the speech 
is not 'important' even on the Court's terms." 427 U.S. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For com-
mentary critical of speech valuation, see, e.g., Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: 
The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 82-83 (1978); Farber, 
supra note 33, at 746-47; Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 20, 31 n.55 (1975). 
52. Taken alone, Young might be precedent for upholding juvenile access restrictions solely 
on the basis of their low - albeit extant - first amendment value, thus functioning as an alterna-
tive to O'Brien analysis. Like Detroit's "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance," access restrictions circum-
scribe, but do not suppress outright, the availability of nonobscene sexually explicit material. In 
Young, the city's interest in the character of its neighborhoods, without more, sufficed to sustain 
the Detroit zoning ordinance. If Young formed the sole precedent for limited regulation of sexu-
ally related speech, then the governmental interest in limiting the availability of sexual material 
to juveniles, which received explicit constitutional sanction in Ginsberg, might be sufficient to 
sustain juvenile access restrictions without reference to the O'Brien test. 
It is beyond the purpose of this Note to enter the speech valuation fray by positing Young and 
its progeny as an alternative to O'Brien analysis. However, it is significant that the Court tends 
to relax its scrutiny of regulations of sexual speech even when the effect on speech is not merely 
incidental. 
53. Compare note 7 supra with note 40 supra. 
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on the borderline between pornography and artistic expression," and 
therefore, according to Young, implicates "surely a less vital interest 
. . . than . . . the free dissemination of ideas of social and political 
significance."54 Recognition that the Court has on occasion acknowl-
edged the low value of nonobscene sexually explicit material makes 
the case for O'Brien analysis extremely strong even if the O'Brien pre-
cedent is taken at its weakest. 
Access restrictions undoubtedly do not fit the implicit public fo-
rum exception to sustenance under O'Brien - the commercial display 
of books and magazines is not a traditional forum for exercising free 
speech rights. 55 Indeed, access restrictions implicate a form of speech 
for which the Court has shown strikingly little solicitude.56 Thus, any 
implicit prerequisites to the application of O'Brien are met with re-
spect to statutes restricting access to juvenile obscenity. 
Ill. APPLYING O'BRIEN 
The first of O'Brien's three criteria requires that a regulation fur-
ther an "important or substantial governmental interest."57 Ginsberg 
establishes beyond cavil that a statute restricting juvenile access to ma-
terial that is obscene as to minors satisfies this criterion. 58 Only the 
second and third criteria remain to be analyzed. 
A. Unrelated to the Suppression of Free Expression 
The second criterion, that the governmental interest be "unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression,"59 is the heart of the O'Brien 
test. 60 Its mandate can be broken down into two separate inquiries: 
whether the regulation advances a genuinely nonspeech object and 
whether this nonspeech object forms the rationale for the regulation. 
A skeletal version of the first inquiry must, of course, have been satis-
fied in order to merit O'Brien scrutiny in the first instance. But even 
the most egregious speech infringements can claim some nonspeech 
purpose such as "danger of riot, unlawful action or violent overthrow 
54. 427 U.S. at 61. 
55. In fact, commercial advertising had little first amendment protection until the 1970s. 
Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
56. But see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), in which the Court struck 
down an ordinance that prohibited drive-in movie theaters from displaying any film containing 
nudity ifthe screen was visible from a public street. In that case, however, the Court found that 
the proscribed nudity "cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors." 422 U.S. at 213. 
57. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The full O'Brien test is quoted in the text accompanying note 
32 supra. 
58. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639-43. See also Part I supra. 
59. 391 U.S. at 377. 
60. Professor Ely refers to this portion of the O'Brien analysis as "what is obviously intended 
as the definitive statement of [the Court's] test." Ely, supra note 32, at 1496. 
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of the government."61 Under the second criterion the Court must de-
termine whether a genuine nonspeech object animates the regulation: 
criterion two is the nonspeech requirement in earnest. 
The crucial inquiry under the second criterion according to Profes-
sor Ely is "whether the harm that the State is seeking to avert is one 
that grows out of the fact that the defendant is communicating ... or 
rather would arise even if the defendant's conduct had no communica-
tive significance whatsoever."62 Thus, for example, the O'Brien Court 
found that because the prohibition on draft card burning did "not dis-
tinguish between public and private destruction, and ... [did] not pun-
ish only destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing views," it 
was not the communicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct that the gov-
ernment sought to regulate. 63 Rather, the purpose of the regulation 
was to ensure the "smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective 
Service System. "64 
The nonspeech object of the regulation upheld in O'Brien seems 
fundamentally different from the nonspeech object of juvenile access 
restrictions. Far from unrelated to the communicative impact of the 
regulated conduct, access restrictions define the material regulated on 
the basis of its content. Only material that "appeals to the prurient 
interest" of juveniles, "depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive 
way" with respect to what is suitable for juveniles, and "lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political or scientific value" is subject to regulation.65 
The sole rationale for restriction is that the expressive content of this 
material is harmful to juveniles. 66 
At the base of this "communicative impact" inquiry is the content-
neutral doctrine which underlies much first amendment analysis. The 
content-neutral precept holds that "above all else, the First Amend-
ment means that government has no power to restrict expression be-
cause of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."67 All 
of this seems to bode ill for state restrictions on juvenile access to por-
nography - the communicative content of juvenile pornography pro-
vides the exclusive justification for access restrictions. 
Yet the content-neutral canon is of questionable relevance to regu-
lations on juvenile obscenity. If content discrimination were uni-
formly unconstitutional, it is the Court's "obscene as to juveniles" 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 1497. 
63. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375. 
64. 391 U.S. at 382. 
65. See text at note 17 supra. 
66. Indeed, it is the communicative impact of juvenile obscenity that both places it outside 
the protection of the first amendment as to children and inside the first amendment's scope as to 
adults. 
67. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
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holding itself that would be invalid, not the resulting state regulations. 
And that argument not only comes too late, but also misconceives the 
content-neutrality requirement. 
Content neutrality assumes that the regulated expression is pro-
tected; it does not govern ~he determination of protection in the first 
instance. 68 Otherwise every governmental regulation would be poten-
tially subject to first amendment scrutiny. Robbery, treason, and with-
holding one's tax returns might all conceivably contain expressive 
content, but laws proscribing these activities do not violate the first 
amendment. The reason that laws against robbery do not violate the 
first amendment is not because they survive the O'Brien test, but 
rather because robbery - based on its content or "communicative im-
pact" - is excluded from first amendment protection. 69 Thus, con-
tent neutrality is required only when the regulated activity is within 
the ambit of the first amendment. 
Juvenile obscenity is banished from the realm of first amendment 
protection - with regard to juveniles. And it is exclusively to minors 
that access restrictions direct their attention: juvenile obscenity shall 
not be displayed where minors may have access. 70 With respect to 
juveniles, these regulations have the same first amendment status as 
laws against full-fledged obscenity, robbery, or the nonspeech element 
of draft card burning: they do not implicate first amendment speech. 
Although access restrictions incidentally affect the protected speech 
interests of adults, they primarily affect the nonspeech interests of 
juveniles. The governmental interest in circumscribing a minor's ac-
cess to juvenile obscenity is therefore an interest "unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression."71 
Analysis of juvenile access restrictions under the second criterion 
would end here if the second criterion required that the asserted gov-
ernmental interest be "unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion." By adverting only to the governmental interest, however, the 
O'Brien test seems to invite inquiry into legislative motive. Yet, nota-
bly, Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in O'Brien explicitly 
rejected consideration of legislative motive for the purpose of invali-
dating an otherwise constitutional statute: "We decline to void essen-
tially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had 
68. On the distinction between coverage and protection, see, e.g., F. SCHAUER, FREE 
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-92, 134-35 (1982); Schauer, supra note 26, at 920. See 
generally Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. Cr. REV. 1. 
69. That is, if the communicative impact of the formulation, "This is a stick-up" is that the 
statement is in jest or part of a theatrical production, then the expression is not a robbery and, 
absent other disabilities, is probably protected by the first amendment. But if the communicative 
impact reveals that the speaker intends a compulsory transfer of funds, his expression is simply 
not first amendment speech. See Schauer, supra note 26, at 905 n.34 (citing cases in which the 
Supreme Court has denied first amendment coverage to communication as part of an illegal net). 
70. See text at notes 75-77 infra. 
71. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
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the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its 
exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech 
about it. " 72 According to O'Brien, the Court would look to legislative 
history only as an aid in interpreting the legislation.73 In determining 
whether the governmental interest furthered by access restrictions is 
unrelated to the suppression of free speech, therefore, the Court pre-
sumably will look no further than to the interest apparent on the face 
of the statute. 74 
A constitutionally permissible objective is necessarily embodied in 
the language of juvenile access restrictions. For example, the disputed 
regulation in American Booksellers provided, "It shall be unlawful for 
any person ... to knowingly display for commercial purpose in a man-
ner whereby juveniles may examine and peruse [material obscene as to 
juveniles]."75 In Upper Midwest Booksellers the regulation at issue 
stated, "It is unlawful for any person commercially and knowingly to 
exhibit [or] display ... any material which is [obscene as to 
72. 391 U.S. at 384. In the context of the O'Brien case, Warren's statement was not mere 
dictum: a cursory glance at the legislative history of the Selective Service regulation at issue 
would have been likely to reveal an improper legislative motive. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 
33, at 596-97. 
73. To be sure, Supreme Court examinations of legislative history have resulted in the invali-
dation of otherwise constitutional statutes often enough to call Warren's disclaimer into question. 
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (state statute authorizing a moment of silence for 
prayer or meditation struck down solely on the basis of legislative history indicating an intent to 
promote school prayer). However, close examinations of legislative motives have tended to be 
restricted to equal protection cases. For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233 (1936), the Court invalidated a tax on newspaper advertisements based on the circulation of 
the newspaper because, "in the light of its history and of its present setting, [the tax was] seen to 
be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to 
which the public is entitled." 297 U.S. at 250. 
Moreover, in no case analyzed under O'Brien has the Court "void[ed] a statute ... constitu-
tional on its face, on the basis of what [the legislators] said about it." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 384. 
Indeed, in Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986), the Court cited O'Brien in explic-
itly rejecting the court of appeals' theory that "if 'a motivating factor' in enacting the ordinance 
was to restrict [the] exercise of First Amendment rights the ordinance would be invalid, appar-
ently no matter how small a part this motivating factor may have played in the City Council's 
decision." 106 S. Ct. at 929, quoting Playtime Theaters v. Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 537 (9th Cir. 
1984). Thus, because the "predominate concerns" of the City Council "were found to be with the 
secondary effects of adult theaters, and not with the content of adult films themselves," 106 S. Ct. 
at 929, the ordinance was sustained. Even in Grosjean, the Court's appraisal of the legislative 
animus derived not from any legislative history of the tax but from the face of the provision itself: 
"The form in which the tax is imposed is in itself suspicious. It is not measured or limited by the 
volume of advertisements. It is measured alone by the extent of the circulation of the publication 
.... " 297 U.S. at 251. 
At least in the context of incidental restrictions on speech, it seems that Warren's prescription 
for the proper use of legislative history in adjudication survives. 
74. Even if one were to conclude that the Court were willing to inquire into legislative motive 
in spite of Chief Justice Warren's admonition to the contrary, the question of whether juvenile 
access restrictions result from impure motives could not be answered in the abstract. Arguably 
access restrictions could result from improper motives, but one could only discover that by exam-
ining an actual legislature's actual legislative enactment and legislative history. Cf. note 78 
supra. 
75. American Booksellers Assn., 802 F.2d at 693 n.2. 
1694 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1681 
juveniles]."76 The contested provision in M.S. News declared, "No 
person having custody, control or supervision of any commercial es-
tablishment shall knowingly: ... display material which is [obscene as 
to juveniles] in such a way that minors ... will be exposed to view 
such material."77 The similarity is not coincidental: this phraseology 
represents the simplest manner of effecting the governmental purpose 
of limiting juvenile access to sexually explicit material, a purpose legit-
imated in Ginsberg. Because the language of the access restrictions 
that have come before the federal courts of appeals most naturally sug-
gests a governmental interest "unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression," the second part of the O'Brien test is satisfied by these 
statutes.78 
B. No Greater Than Is Essential to the Furtherance of the 
Governmental Interest 
Once it is established that a particular regulation is supported by a 
"substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression," the restriction on first amendment rights must be 
shown to be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest."79 Herein lies the final hurdle posed by O'Brien. 
This least-restrictive-alternative analysis presupposes that the leg-
islature has chosen a particular alternative from among a number of 
measures which might have advanced the legislative purpose. How-
ever, none of the access restrictions considered by the federal courts of 
appeals mandate a particular means to the end of preventing a minor's 
access to juvenile pornography. so Unlike statutes that ban specific con-
76. Upper Midwest Booksellers, 780 F.2d. at 1407 (Appendix). 
77. M.S. News, 721 F.2d. at 1296 (Appendix). 
78. Conceivably, a legislature could enact a statute which on its face revealed an intent to 
constrain adult access to juvenile obscenity. But the face of the statute would betray such an 
improper motive only if it included restraints superfluous to restricting the access of minors - in 
which case it would be something more than a juvenile access restriction. 
Moreover, even in the face of evidence that a legislative body thought the adventitious imped-
iment to adults' first amendment freedoms a happy consequence of prohibitions on juvenile ac-
cess, it is difficult to believe that this effect of the statute could actually be more important to the 
legislators than the effect on juvenile access, or that the interest in regulating juvenile access to 
pornography could be a mere pretext for restraining adult access. The preeminent objective inev-
itably furthered by such laws is to place the material out of the reach of minors. Hence, such 
statutes necessarily further a nonspeech governmental interest untainted by improper legislative 
motives. 
79. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
80. The access restrictions at issue in the M.S. News and Upper Midwest Booksellers cases did 
prescribe measures that would be deemed compliant, but these were not exclusive and were 
largely redundant in any case. For instance, the statute considered in Upper Midwest Booksellers 
excepted from its purview material enclosed in opaque covers, elaborating: "The requirement of 
an opaque cover shall be deemed satisfied concerning such material if those portions of the cover, 
covers, or packaging containing such material harmful to minors are blocked from view by an 
opaque cover." MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. ORDINANCE§ 385.131(6)(a), quoted in 780 F.2d at 1407-
08 (Appendix). 
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duct as an intermediate step toward advancing the governmental inter-
est, these statutes simply state the governmental purpose and place the 
chosen means to that end in the hands of the bookseller. Incidental 
restrictions on speech that do "no more than eliminate the exact 
source of the evil [the legislature] sought to remedy"81 allow no less 
restrictive alternative analysis. If the state is permitted to eliminate 
the perceived evil, such regulations will be upheld. 
Moreover, a legislature could presume that the self-regulating 
bookseller would choose the least restrictive method of compliance -
be it a separate room for adults, opaque covers, or blinder racks - on 
account of his profit motive. 82 Particular bookstores and types of juve-
nile obscenity may be amenable to different sorts of restrictions, and a 
general prohibition on juvenile access permits the storekeeper to 
choose any combination of restraints that furthers the governmental 
interest. The sole alternative is to specify a single or several permissi-
ble display methods which would limit the available modes of compli-
ance. In other words, the only other means of furthering the 
government's interest would very likely be more restrictive. 83 
On the other hand, broadly phrased prohibitions arguably consti-
tute a greater restriction because of their potential to "chill" speech. 
If particular compliance methods are not enumerated, a bookseller 
might opt for maximum restriction, or discontinue the sale of juvenile 
obscenity altogether. In discussing the difficulty a bookseller would 
have in attempting to comply with Virginia's access restriction the 
Fourth Circuit implicitly raised the danger that nonspecific access re-
strictions pose to the first amendment rights of adults. 84 The court 
81. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984). 
82. The bookseller's remunerative incentive resembles that presumed to goad the "orator" of 
commercial speech. In the commercial speaker's case, the assumed profit motive justifies, in 
part, the limited first amendment protection accorded his expression. See Virginia State Board 
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) 
("[C]ommercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua 
non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and 
foregone entirely."). Obviously, it will be in the bookseller's interest to adopt the display method 
that sells the most juvenile obscenity to adults, and it seems reasonable to assume that this will be 
the method that infringes least on the first amendment rights of adults. 
83. Particularity could only approximate the range of options available to the bookseller 
under a general statute if the enumeration of compliance methods were exhaustive or reduce his 
options if the enumeration were less than exhaustive. 
84. American Booksellers, 802 F.2d at 695-96. Oddly, the court indicates that one of the 
problems with the statute is that the definition of the affected material is not clear. For instance, 
the court discusses the divergent opinions of the bookstore owners and the government as to the 
amount of the booksellers' inventory that would be covered concluding that "[i]t cannot be gain-
said ... that book retailers face a substantial problem attempting to comply with the [regulation] 
in ordering, [and] reviewing ... publications for sale." 802 F.2d at 696. But because this portion 
of the statute mimics the law sustained in Ginsberg, it is immune from constitutional challenge 
and any alleged definitional ambiguities are irrelevant. Compare VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-390, 
18.2-391, 18.2-391.1 (Supp. 1987), with N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 484-h, supra note 7. 
Moreover, the restriction struck down was an amendment to a Virginia law that forbids the 
sale of the same material to juveniles. Thus, Virginia booksellers face precisely the same "sub-
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declared that the access restriction's breadth constituted its "most se-
rious fiaw." 85 Because, in the words of the court, the statute required 
that material obscene as to juveniles "not be displayed so that minors 
may have access to [it],"86 the court interpreted the regulation to man-
date displays impenetrable by "any determined juvenile. " 87 A 
uniquely determined juvenile, however, will not jeopardize a 
merchant's compliance method because the statute includes a scienter 
requirement: "It shall be unlawful ... to knowingly display for com-
mercial purpose in a manner whereby juveniles may examine and pe-
ruse [material obscene as to minors]."88 The rare juvenile incursion 
into prohibited territory will not give the bookseller "reason to know 
or a ... ground for belief"89 that his method is inadequate.90 
Whether the unequivocal notice provided by specificity is less re-
strictive than the latitude afforded by generality in an access restric-
tion is, at best, a close call. Close calls require judicial deference to the 
legislative choice. As the Court said when addressing the claim that 
the National Park Service's prohibition on sleeping in Lafayette Park 
was not the least speech-restrictive means of preventing damage to the 
Park: 
We do not believe ... that either United States v. O'Brien or the time, 
place, or manner decisions assign to the judiciary the authority to re-
place the Park Service as the manager of the Nation's parks or endow 
the judiciary with the competence to judge how much protection of park 
lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained.91 
stantial problem ... in ordering [and] reviewing ... publications for sale" irrespective of the 
display restriction since they must be able to identify the material that they cannot sell to minors. 
85. 802 F.2d at 695. 
86. 802 F.2d at 696 (emphasis in original). 
87. 802 F.2d at 696. 
88. VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.2-39l(a) (Supp. 1987). 
89. The Virginia access restriction defines "knowingly" as "having general knowledge of, or 
reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry.'' 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-390(7) (Supp. 1987). 
90. On the other hand, an access regulation that simply required particular display methods 
- while clear enough to guide a law-abiding merchant - might not prevent juvenile access in 
fact. If the ordinance were lawfully complied with even as hordes of minors flipped through 
material on the "adults only" shelf, it would not serve its intended purpose. Cf. Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 425 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Indeed, the State's claim of 
concern over this problem is undermined by the general practice [which allows evasion of the 
purported interest]"). Absent a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible state interest -
in this case, shielding juveniles from sexually explicit material - the state cannot randomly 
regulate a bookstore owner's display methods. 
The access restrictions upheld by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits proffered suitable compli· 
ance methods but these were defined in terms of their actual capacity to shield juveniles from 
exposure to the material. See, e.g., note 80 supra. Thus, a bookseller who adopted one of the 
suggested measures would not be deemed in compliance unless his display method actually pre-
vented juvenile access in any event. 
91. Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (footnote 
omitted). See also Young, 427 U.S. at 71 ("It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of [the 
city's] decision to require adult theaters to be separated rather than concentrated in the same 
areas.''); Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 106 S. Ct. 925, 931 (1986) ("We .•. find no constitutional 
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Neither specificity nor generality in access restrictions seems 
clearly "greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the governmen-
tal] interest." Both types, therefore, satisfy the last of the O'Brien 
test's requirements. Restrictions on juvenile access to material ob-
scene as to minors are constitutional under the O'Brien analysis. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although declamations that the first amendment is blind to the 
value of speech punctuate the Court's first amendment rulings, many 
of the Court's opinions explicitly or implicitly rely on the relative 
value of the affected speech. The most salient class of speech toward 
which the Court tends to disregard the content-neutrality dictum is 
nonobscene pornography - speech that teases the prurient appeal 
standard while remaining constitutionally chaste. Material obscene as 
to juveniles is unquestionably speech of this type; as to minors, it goes 
so far as to satisfy the prurient interest criterion. Clearly that fact 
alone does not end the inquiry. Speech valuation at its strongest 
means that, as to adults, this material is of low first amendment value 
- not no first amendment value. 
But because restrictions on sexually related nonobscene speech are 
frequently accorded lenient first amendment scrutiny, the O'Brien test 
is uniquely apposite. Although the Supreme Court may hesitate 
before applying O'Brien analysis to some incidental restrictions on ex-
pression, regulation of material obscene as to juveniles and on the edge 
of obscenity as to adults is not one of those. 
Moreover, the O'Brien test does not require that the speech af-
fected be of a type that "few of us would march our sons and daugh-
ters off to war to preserve."92 Rather, O'Brien requires only that the 
regulation further an "important or substantial governmental interest 
... unrelated to the suppression of free expression" in a manner least 
restrictive of first amendment rights.93 O'Brien scrutiny thus obviates 
the need for an acknowledgement that material obscene as to juveniles 
is of low first amendment value. · 
O'Brien's three-part analysis provides an effective filter against the 
principal hazard posed by such regulations: that they will become ve-
hicles for the suppression of protected speech. State laws that prohibit 
juvenile access to material that is obscene as to minors, however, serve 
the same important governmental interest that the Court relied upon 
in Ginsberg. And because juvenile obscenity is nonspeech as to 
juveniles, the governmental interest primarily advanced by juvenile ac-
defect in the method chosen by Renton to further its substantial interests .... '[T]he city must be 
allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.' " 
(quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71)). 
92. Young, 427 U.S. at 70. 
93. 391 U.S. at 377. 
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cess restrictions is unrelated to the suppression of free speech. Finally, 
when juvenile access restrictions state their commands in general 
terms which directly advance the governmental interest, there exists 
no less restrictive alternative. 
Future legislative enactments regulating material obscene as to mi-
nors, however, may be less circumspect in their mandates. The first 
amendment demands that juvenile access restrictions, though primar-
ily affecting nonspeech, be tailored as narrowly as possible, to avoid 
abridging the legitimate speech rights of adults. For such a purpose 
was the O'Brien test designed. 
-Ann H. Coulter 
